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OWNING PROPERTY WITHOUT PRIVACY:
HOW LAVAN v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
OFFERS INCREASED FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION TO SKID ROW’S HOMELESS
Benjamin G. Kassis*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2011, Tony Lavan and seven other Los Angeles
Skid Row residents became fed up.1 It had been only a few weeks
since their personal belongings were seized and destroyed by Los
Angeles city officials, and sensing that their constitutional rights had
been infringed, they sought legal counsel. Thereafter Lavan and his
seven coplaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) filed a purported class action against
the city of Los Angeles (the “City”), alleging that City officials had
violated their individual rights by disregarding the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, among other constitutional
provisions.2
By the time the case reached the Ninth Circuit, a significant
constitutional question had surfaced: Does the Fourth Amendment
protect an indigent individual’s unattended personal belongings from
unreasonable seizure?3 The court, in a 2–1 decision, answered in the

* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Communication
Studies, Loyola Marymount University, May, 2010.
1. Skid Row is located in downtown Los Angeles, California, and contains the largest
concentration of homeless persons in the city. L.A. HOMELESS SERVS. AUTH., 2011 GREATER
LOS ANGELES HOMELESS COUNT REPORT 37 (2011), available at http://www.lahsa.org/docs
/2011-Homeless-Count/HC11-Detailed-Geography-Report-FINAL.PDF;
see
also
L.A.
HOMELESS SERVS. AUTH., 2009 GREATER LOS ANGELES HOMELESS COUNT REPORT 1 (2009),
available at http://www.lahsa.org/docs/HC09/SKID_ROW_Jan13_10.pdf (detailing Skid Row
homeless population statistics).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); Lavan v. City of Los
Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012).
3. See Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012).
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affirmative.4
The conclusion reached by the majority of the court is of
particular importance to members of homeless communities located
in the Ninth Circuit. Because such individuals have no homes in
which to store their personal property, questions of ownership,
privacy, and property rights are difficult to settle. Perhaps more so
than anything, belongings located within the sturdy confines of the
home suggest ownership and privacy expectations, while those left
on the sidewalk are surely open to ambiguity and dispute.
Accordingly, homeless individuals’ personal property, often left on
sidewalks and in other public areas, will likely come into direct
conflict with a city’s efforts to remove seemingly unowned property
and to maintain clean and unsoiled streets.5 The court confronted this
conflict in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles.6
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of the
case, while Part III sets forth the court’s reasoning in concluding that
the Fourth Amendment extends to Plaintiffs’ belongings. Part IV
examines that reasoning in the context of past and current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and includes a discussion of the opinion’s
legal and practical significance in the Ninth Circuit. Part V concludes
that Lavan’s explicit shift away from a strictly privacy-based
approach to the Fourth Amendment offers an extra layer of
constitutional protection to homeless individuals’ property.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As is common practice of many individuals living in Skid Row,
Plaintiffs had made a habit of storing their personal belongings in a
variety of “mobile shelters.”7 Nonprofit organizations throughout
Skid Row provided such shelters to Plaintiffs, usually in the form of
4. Id.
5. See id. at 1025; see also, e.g., Alexandra Zavis, Major Cleanup of L.A. Skid Row,
Prompted by Health Report, Begins, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012
/jun/20/local/la-me-skid-row-cleanup-20120620 (reporting on personal property seizures on Skid
Row).
6. 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). Though the Lavan court also examined and resolved
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, its holding as to the Fourth Amendment demonstrates
the legal shift at which this Comment is directed. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiffs’ personal belongings constitute protectable “property.” Id. at
1031–33.
7. Id. at 1025.
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either carts or apparatuses known as EDARs.8 Plaintiffs, like many
others, kept numerous important possessions in these tiny shelters,
including identification documents, family memorabilia, and various
medications.9
On numerous occasions between February and March 2011,
Plaintiffs temporarily left their shelters unattended on the City’s
public sidewalks to “perform necessary tasks[,] such as showering,
eating, using restrooms, or attending court.”10 During these brief
periods, City officials, though notified that the property was not
abandoned,11 took and subsequently “trashed” Plaintiffs’ carts and
EDARs.12 The City never provided Plaintiffs the opportunity to
retrieve their personal belongings before destroying them.13
In support of its actions, the City argued that the seizure and
destruction14 of Plaintiffs’ personal belongings had been authorized
by local statute and that Plaintiffs had been given notice of the same.
Specifically, the City pointed to Los Angeles Municipal Code section
56.11, which provides that “[n]o person shall leave or permit to
remain any merchandise, baggage[,] or any article of personal
property upon any parkway or sidewalk.”15 In addition, the City had
posted approximately seventy-three signs throughout Skid Row,
warning residents that there would be regular street clean-ups
between certain hours.16
8. Id. at 1025 n.4 (“EDARs are small, collapsible mobile shelters provided to homeless
persons by Everyone Deserves a Roof, a nonprofit organization.”).
9. Id. at 1025.
10. Id.
11. Id. (“The city did not have a good-faith belief that [Plaintiffs’] possessions were
abandoned when it destroyed them. Indeed, . . . [bystanders] explained to City employees that the
property was not abandoned, and implored the City not to destroy it.”). Though subtle, this fact
was crucial to Lavan’s holding. It suggests that Plaintiffs’ mobile shelters would not have come
within the Fourth Amendment’s scope had city officials maintained a “good-faith” belief that the
shelters were abandoned.
12. Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 693
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012).
13. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1026–27.
14. Id. at 1025 (observing that the City seized and immediately destroyed Plaintiffs’
belongings).
15. L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 56.11 (1963), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt
/gateway.dll/California/lamc/municipalcode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:los
angeles_ca_mc.
16. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1033–34 (Callahan, J., dissenting). The signs read as follows:
Please take notice that Los Angeles Municipal Code § 56.11 prohibits
leaving any merchandise, baggage or personal property on a public
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Seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against the
City’s practices, Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against the
City in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.17
Among other things, Plaintiffs alleged that the City’s practice of
seizing and destroying their personal property was unreasonable and
thus violated their Fourth Amendment rights.18
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, finding that they had established a likelihood of success
on the merits of their constitutional claim. In particular, Plaintiffs had
shown that the City’s seizure and swift destruction of their mobile
shelters was likely unreasonable, thereby violating the Fourth
Amendment.19
The City appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously
applied the Fourth Amendment to Plaintiffs’ unattended shelters
despite the fact that Plaintiffs’ lack of any privacy interest in those
shelters should have precluded such protection.20 In other words, the
City contended that Plaintiffs could not have established a likelihood
of success on the merits because their mobile shelters did not come
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection.21 In a 2–1
decision, the Ninth Circuit disagreed.22
III. THE REASONING OF THE COURT
On appeal, the City drew upon the Fourth Amendment standard
established in Katz v. United States23 and argued that Plaintiffs did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their unattended
shelters.24 The City argued that, under Katz, this absence of privacy

sidewalk. The City of Los Angeles has a regular clean-up of this area
scheduled for Monday through Friday between 8:00 and 11:00 am. Any
property left at or near this location at the time of this clean-up is subject to
disposal by the City of Los Angeles.
Id.
17. Lavan, 797 F. Supp. 2d. at 1009.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1016.
20. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027.
21. Id. (“The City’s only argument on appeal is that its seizure and destruction of
[Plaintiffs’] unabandoned property [does not] implicate[] . . . the Fourth . . . Amendment.”).
22. Id. at 1027–33.
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027.
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expectations precluded the Fourth Amendment’s protection.25
The Lavan court began its opinion by introducing the Search and
Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment and ultimately held that its
protections do extend to Plaintiffs’ mobile shelters left unattended on
the City sidewalks.26 In reaching this conclusion, the court
distinguished the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches from its protection against unreasonable
seizures.27 Citing to United States v. Jacobsen,28 the court initially
observed that a search is a governmental intrusion “upon an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable,” while a seizure is a government action that causes
“meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in
[his] property.”29 Once a court determines that a government action
constitutes a search or seizure, it then must determine whether the
search or seizure was reasonable.30
Based on the distinction set forth in Jacobsen, the court
determined that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not required to
show a Fourth Amendment violation arising out of a seizure, which
occurred here.31 To further support its reasoning, the court cited the
Supreme Court’s holdings in United States v. Jones32 and Soldal v.
Cook County.33 Collectively, these holdings suggest that “a
reasonable expectation of privacy is not required for Fourth
Amendment protections to apply.”34 Essentially, by way of the above
25. Id.; see also id. at 1035–39 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause the district court
misapprehended the law, its ruling should be vacated” since “‘[a] district court’s decision is based
on an erroneous legal standard if: (1) the court did not employ the appropriate legal standards that
govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction; or (2) in applying the appropriate legal standards,
the court misapprehends the law with respect to the underlying issues in the litigation.’” (quoting
Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1999))).
26. Id. at 1030 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 1027.
28. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
29. Lavan, 693 F. 3d at 1027 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113).
30. See Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1030.
31. Id. (“[B]y seizing and destroying [Plaintiffs’] unabandoned [belongings], the City
meaningfully interfered with [Plaintiffs’] possessory interests in that property.”).
32. 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (holding that “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall
with the Katz formulation”).
33. 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (noting that the Katz emphasis on privacy has not “snuffed out
the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment”); see also
Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027–28 (“Appellees need not show a reasonable expectation of privacy to
enjoy the protection of the Fourth Amendment against seizures of their unabandoned property.”).
34. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028.
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three opinions, the court held that Plaintiffs were able to seek
protection of their belongings against unreasonable seizure
regardless of whether they maintained a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” in them.35 Accordingly, nothing more than “some
meaningful interference” with an individual’s property is required to
trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
government seizure.36 To this end, Plaintiffs’ shelters, though
unattended to and left in public view, constitute protectable property
under the Fourth Amendment.
Having established that the district court had applied a proper
Fourth Amendment legal standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded its
analysis by affirming the district court’s discretionary findings—that
(1) the City did interfere with Plaintiffs’ possessory interests in their
property by seizing Plaintiffs’ mobile shelters, and (2) the City’s
seizure and immediate destruction of the shelters were likely to be
found unreasonable.37
IV. ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION
AND EXPANSION OF EMERGING
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
In sum, Lavan v. City of Los Angeles held that the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable government seizures
notwithstanding any objective privacy interest.38 Such a holding
appears unremarkable enough. In fact, the court’s ultimate finding in
Lavan seems to be no more than a logical extension of the Fourth
Amendment precedent established in Jacobsen, Jones, and Soldal.39

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1027, 1030.
37. Id. at 1030–31. As to the City’s argument regarding Plaintiffs’ violation of the municipal
code, the court reasoned:
[e]ven if we were to assume, as the City maintains, that Appellees violated
LAMC § 56.11 . . . the seizure and destruction of [their] property remains
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Violation
of a City ordinance does not vitiate the Fourth Amendment’s protection of
one’s property. Were it otherwise, the government could seize and destroy
any illegally parked car or unlawfully unattended dog without implicating
the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 1029.
38. Id. at 1027–28.
39. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56
(1992); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); see also Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028.
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Lavan, however, represents more than a mere application of facts to
judicial precedent. Rather, it solidifies an expansion of Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures and endorses a
significant move away from the Katz privacy-based scheme of the
last several decades.40 In order to fully explore the opinion, this
Comment examines pre- and post-Katz Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Lavan court’s outright endorsement of a shift
away from Katz, and the particular impact that the opinion has on
homeless communities located within the Ninth Circuit.
A. The Mid-Twentieth Century Emphasis Shift from
Property Rights to Privacy Interests
Until the latter half of the 1900s, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence protected against trespass to property, not persons.41 In
order for a policeman to conduct an informational search in pre-1900
America, for instance, he would have to do so by physically
intruding upon a private setting and placing himself within earshot of
an otherwise confidential conversation.42 However, the advent of
“remote surveillance [and other] communication devices” created a
less physically intrusive means by which government officials could
glean information from potential wrongdoers, and the property-based
approach to the Fourth Amendment became problematic.43 Naturally,
these newfound deficiencies inherent in the strictly property-based
approach necessitated a more modernized constitutional doctrine,
one with an eye toward the person.44 In 1967 this tension led the

40. See Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027–31; see also Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two
Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 119, 120 (2002) (observing that Katz “[u]sher[ed] in modern Fourth Amendment doctrine”).
41. Will Stancil, Warrantless Search Cases Are Really All the Same, 97 MINN. L. REV. 337,
340 (2012).
42. See id.
43. Id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that “the
search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his papers, or his effects”). But see Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that “the underpinnings of Olmstead . . .
[have] been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling”).
44. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1517–18
(2010). Solove observes that the Court’s initial approach was to “focus on physical types of
intrusions.” Id. at 1517. However, “technology changed everything. Developed in the late
nineteenth century, telephone communication—and the ability to wiretap telephone
conversations—posed new and challenging Fourth Amendment questions.” Id. at 1518.
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Supreme Court to consider Katz v. United States.45
Katz shifted the Fourth Amendment’s focus from trespass to
property to the individual’s interest in and expectation of his or her
privacy. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”
repeated Justice John Marshall Harlan II, not more than a handful of
words before establishing what would become the modern bedrock
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the Katz test.46 The test is twofold, requiring that in order to challenge government action under the
Fourth Amendment, a complainant must show “first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”47 In Katz, the government action at issue
was a search rather than a seizure, but the emphasis on privacy that
Katz established would, for decades, become the polestar of the
Search and Seizure Clause in its entirety.48 However, two recent
Supreme Court opinions created the opportunity for yet another
Fourth Amendment shift, both of which became the basis for the
holding in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles.49
B. The Inevitable Dissolution of Privacy Interests As a
Fourth Amendment Precondition
In 2012 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v.
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. Id. at 361; see also Colb, supra note 40 (explaining how Katz established the Court’s
current approach to Fourth Amendment applicability); Solove, supra note 44, at 1518–19 (same).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
48. Id. at 356; see also, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177–78 (1984) (“Since
Katz v. United States, the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question
whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (citation
omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (finding that “a ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property,” but further observing that
the government action was reasonable because the complainant’s “privacy interest in the [item
seized] had been largely compromised” and thus “could no longer support an expectation of
privacy” (emphasis added)); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978) (holding that the
complainants were unable to seek Fourth Amendment protection “since they made no showing
that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy” in the area searched or the items seized);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–42 (1976) (holding that bank records seized by
government officials were not protected under the Fourth Amendment because no legitimate
expectation of privacy existed in them).
49. See generally Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027–30 (9th Cir. 2012)
(explaining how the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Jones and Soldal expanded Fourth
Amendment protection beyond privacy expectations).
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Jones and held that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not
required to trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protection.50 There, the
Court held that surveillance equipment attached to the underbody of
a car constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, not because
the owner had had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information obtained through the surveillance equipment, but
because the government physically had trespassed on the individual’s
personal property.51 In so holding, the Court both scrutinized the
Katz test and attempted to clarify its limits.52 Specifically, the Court
stated that “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the
Katz formulation” and that Katz “did not narrow the Fourth
Amendment’s scope.”53 Though not attempting to replace the Katz
test itself, the Court nevertheless invited Lavan-like opinions into
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by placing an explicit emphasis on
property, not privacy.54 In doing so, the Court referenced the second
case crucial to Lavan’s reasoning: Soldal v. Cook County.55
Jones relied heavily on the Soldal opinion to scrutinize and
demarcate the Katz test’s breadth.56 In Soldal, the Court held that the
forcible removal of a trailer home triggered the Fourth Amendment’s
protections, even though the state officials effecting the removal did
not “invade the [complainant’s] privacy.”57 According to Soldal, the
Katz test established that “property rights are not the sole measure of
Fourth Amendment violations,” but Katz did not “snuf[f] out the
previously recognized protection for property.”58 Though not
purporting to alter the Katz test itself, Soldal undoubtedly illuminated
it, suggesting that Katz is but one way in which a person might assert
protection under the Fourth Amendment.59 Jones simply followed
suit, and the two opinions provided the Lavan majority with enough
50. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012).
51. Id. at 949.
52. See id. at 950–53; see also Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028 (explaining how Jones “reiterated
that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not required for Fourth Amendment protections to
apply” because Fourth Amendment rights do not turn exclusively on the Katz test).
53. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51.
54. Id. at 949 (referring to the “significance of property rights in search-and-seizure
analysis”).
55. Id. at 951.
56. See id.
57. 506 U.S. 56, 60–62 (1992).
58. Id. at 64.
59. See id.
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judicial strength to support its primary holding—that some
meaningful interference with one’s property, regardless of any
privacy expectation, is wholly sufficient not only to challenge a
government seizure but to do so successfully.60
C. The Legal and Practical Significance
of Lavan in the Ninth Circuit
As noted above, Lavan v. City of Los Angeles represents a
significant endorsement of non-privacy-based Fourth Amendment
law in the Ninth Circuit, and advances the property-based approach
reintroduced by Soldal, and plainly set forth in Jones.61 Doubtless,
the outcome of a Fourth Amendment challenge to government
seizure is no longer contingent on any “reasonable expectation of
privacy” at all. In the Ninth Circuit, the former requirement is
sufficient to trigger the Amendment’s protection against seizure of
unabandoned property, but it is no longer necessary—this is Lavan’s
bottom line.62
While the facts in Lavan required the court to consider the
Fourth Amendment primarily in the context of government
seizures,63 the court reached its conclusion only after acknowledging
the limited reach of Katz with respect to the Search and Seizure
Clause as a whole.64 As mentioned above, the court’s open
endorsement in dicta of a property-based, “irrespective of privacy”
approach to the search context suggests that the court’s holding
would not have changed had Los Angeles city officials merely
searched Plaintiffs’ belongings.65 The City officials’ theoretical
search of such belongings still would thus have triggered the Fourth
60. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951; see also Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022,
1027–28 (9th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the Fourth Amendment protects against meaningful
interference with one’s property even when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy).
61. As referenced above, Lavan was a split decision. The dissent, rather vehemently,
contended that an expectation of privacy was required for Lavan and his co-plaintiffs to have
Fourth Amendment standing, a common prerequisite under Ninth Circuit precedent prior to
Lavan. See Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1035–39 (Callahan, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., United States v.
SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684, 694–95 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o say that a party lacks
[F]ourth [A]mendment standing is to say that his reasonable expectation of privacy has not been
infringed.” (emphasis omitted)).
62. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1030 (majority opinion).
63. See id. at 1023–27.
64. Id. at 1027–30.
65. Id. at 1029.
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Amendment, even if Plaintiffs maintained absolutely no expectation
of privacy in them.66
As a result of Lavan, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit have gained
an alternative method through which to vindicate their constitutional
rights, and need not stake their Fourth Amendment claims—search
or seizure—on a reasonable expectation of privacy.67 This
developing approach to Fourth Amendment standing is of particular
value when considering its protection of indigent individuals’
property. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a societal faction in the
Ninth Circuit more significantly affected by Lavan than its homeless
communities, the largest among them being Los Angeles’s Skid
Row.68
The property-based Fourth Amendment standard set forth in
Lavan undoubtedly provides Skid Row’s homeless an extra layer of
constitutional protection. For certain, indigent communities often
lack the walls and borders that protect personal property, and such
hard boundaries also suggest that the owner has in her property an
expectation of privacy, both actual and reasonable.69 Those living
about the sidewalks and street corners of Skid Row do not maintain
similar fortunes, as their belongings are perpetually left within the
reach and view of the public. Tony Lavan himself echoed this
sentiment. Seeing a Los Angeles police officer order unattended
belongings off of a city sidewalk, Lavan hollered to a nearby
reporter, “‘What are we supposed to do? Where do they want us to
go?’ . . . ‘We live here!’”70
Thus, it is not surprising that an indigent plaintiff, like Tony
Lavan, might confront considerable difficulty in establishing an
expectation of privacy in his or her belongings—homeless
individuals do not have much of it, and it is simply unrealistic to
suppose otherwise. Ask any one of them, and he or she will tell you:
privacy isn’t free. Those able to afford it may not find difficulty
establishing an objective expectation of privacy in their belongings,
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1121 (2006) (“Skid Row has the highest
concentration of homeless individuals in the United States.”).
69. See Sandy Banks, Mission Hopes a Fee Will Change Skid Row’s Culture, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2011, at A2.
70. Id.
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but there are many who cannot.71 This is one of the practical, realworld effects of Lavan: it offers protection to the legitimate
belongings of those who do not live in privacy, those who are not
accustomed to it, and those who will likely not come to expect it.
V. CONCLUSION
A little over forty-five years ago, Justice Harlan endorsed a
seemingly simple idea: the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”72 At the time, the words were used to preface the privacybased test that his concurrence in Katz would establish, but that
Lavan would decline to apply decades later. However, and perhaps
ironically, Lavan’s reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment, albeit
guided by Jones and Soldal, has only reinforced the spirit of that
statement. By extending the Fourth Amendment’s reach far beyond
mere interests in privacy, the Lavan court has made clear that all
persons in the Ninth Circuit, regardless of circumstance, are afforded
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.

71. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“[P]oor people are entitled to privacy, even if they can’t afford all the
gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it.”).
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting id. at
351 (majority opinion)).

